SBInet is no teacher's pet

It has been a roller coaster few weeks for theHomeland Security Department's high-profileSBInet border surveillance system, and theride is not over yet.On Feb. 22, DHS formally accepted BoeingCo.'s initial Project 28 segment of the SBInetsurveillance system along 28 miles of the borderbetween the United States and Mexico.Five days later, the Government AccountabilityOffice issued a critical report.Headlines proclaimed SBInet a failure, anddepartment officials scrambled to defend it,issuing numerous public statements endorsingSBInet.The controversy continues over whether theinitial segment of the virtual fence and theoverall project are effective.In the midst of this dust-up, there are manylessons contractors can learn about handlingsuch complex projects.SBInet is a public relations disaster, saidJames Jay Carafano, senior research fellow atthe Heritage Foundation.It could take weeks to sort out the mess.For example, two of GAO'sstrongest criticisms were thatthe $20 million Project 28segment does not fully meet Border Patrolusers' needs and those users were not extensivelyconsulted on the work."You have to get to know the users," said RayBjorklund, senior vice president at FedSourcesmarket research firm, in McLean, Va."Otherwise, you risk building a rope swingwhen the users wanted an inner tube."Does SBInet meet enough of its users' needsto be effective? And is the lack of user inputthe fault of DHS, Boeing or both? Experts saythose responsibilities usually fall on the government'sproject managers, but it is too earlyto judge in this case."Typically, you would lookto the program officers forengaging with users at all levels," said StanSoloway, president of the Professional ServicesCouncil.The ambitious SBInet project has been toutedas one of the centerpieces of President Bush'sstrategy to stop illegal immigration and gaincontrol of U.S. borders. Last year, White Houseofficials strongly pushed for an immigration bill,and lawmakers pressed to have SBInet up andrunning as quickly as possible.But speed and success don't always gotogether in information technology contracting.Some observers believe the sense ofextreme urgency worked against Project 28."There was lots of pressure to move forward[on SBInet] along with the immigration bill,"Carafano said. "DHS was unrealistic with thedeadline, and Congress threw fuel on the fire."Meanwhile, there are other lessons to learnfrom SBInet, according to experts in governmentIT contracting. The SBInet project officially began inSeptember 2006 when Boeing won the contract.It is the federal government's thirdattempt to deploy cameras, radar and othersensors along U.S. borders. The project is estimatedto cost $30 billion to span the Mexicanand Canadian land borders.After an initial system run-through in a laboratory,Boeing began installing nine mobiletowers strung with cameras, sensors and communicationsequipment.Although completion was targeted for June2007, the project stretched on for monthsbecause of problems with radar, software andintegration.For example, the software chosen for the commonoperating picture was not adequate toprocess incoming data from the cameras,radar and sensors, GAO said. "SBI officialstold us that Boeing selected the system basedon initial conversations with Border Patrolofficials, but when deployed to the field,Boeing found limitations with the system,"Richard Stana, director of homeland securityand justice at GAO, told Congress Feb. 27.Insiders say limited input from DHS' ITexecutives, rushed development and a drive touse commercial technology as much as possiblecontributed to the problems.The GAO report states that Project 28did not meet expectations, but DHS officialsat the highest levels say it met contractrequirements."We are not mothballing Project 28. It didwork," DHS Secretary MichaelChertoff said Feb. 28. "I envisionthat we will use this design inother parts of the border butnot in the entirety of theborder."Despite such comments,many observers say thatthere is confusion aboutSBInet's effectiveness.For example, DHS nowdescribes Project 28 as aprototype, but in 2006 and early 2007,officials described it more broadly as a tool tosupport Border Patrol.Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.), chairmanof the Homeland Security Committee, said thechange in the project's goal only becameknown to him, though not officially, in October."We began to hear suggestions that Project28 was just a 'demonstration project' or a 'testbed' for future technologies," Thompson wroteto Chertoff in December. If DHS' or Boeing'sexpectations of the project had changed, theyneeded to alert Congress, he said."The department was aiming for a homerun," said Jeremy Potter, senior analyst at marketresearch firm Input Inc. "In the end, DHSwas saying, 'We got a lot from Project 28. Butwe are not getting a home run.'"To avoid mixed messages, governmentclients and contractors should make a strongeffort to keep Congress and the publicinformed of changes in expectations, saidSandy Levine, president of Advice UnlimitedLLC, a public relations firm in Gaithersburg,Md., with a number of government IT clients."Especially with sensitive, large projects,communications needs to be a priority fromDay One," Levine said. "The best thing is to beproactive and transparent in communications."The impression that SBInet is a spiraldevelopment might be complicatingCongress' and the public's reactionto Project 28.In SBInet's case, Boeingtackled an integration ofgreat complexity underextreme environmentalconditions.Boeing officials declinedto comment.One of the keys to spiraldevelopment is keeping expectationslow in the initial phase, as onewould do with an experiment. "In spiral development,you would not expect the first phaseto meet all the users' needs," Soloway said. "Itwas only a prototype; they were not committingthe full amount of funding to it."Carafano agreed. "I don't think Project 28 isa failure," he said. "It was a test, not the fullacquisition." The $20 million cost of Project28 is fairly minimal and should not be consideredwasted spending because it did delivereffective technology, he added.The problems encountered with SBInet arenot surprising considering the department'srelative youth and inexperience, severalobservers say. DHS opened its doors March 1,2003, as a mix of 22 agencies and 180,000government employees."This is a reflection of the department's lackof maturity," Carafano said. "They have neverdone anything like this before."