Steve Charles


DOD gets serious about supply chain security

Get ready to certify your suppliers as 'safe'

Federal contractors are going to be hearing the words “supply chain” a lot over the next 18 months. Having a certifiably secure supply chain will eliminate a potential mark against your selection as a source, just as having the appropriate contract vehicles eliminates friction.

The 2013 National Defense Authorization Act became law last month, even if the defense budget remains mired in politics.

Both Congress and the Office of Management and Budget have been concerned for some time over how prime contractors’ supply chains are really the government’s supply chain. This is an understandable concern, given the degree to which manufacturers have abandoned vertical integration in favor of assembly and integration of many suppliers’ parts, including software.

The 2013 NDAA instructs DOD to keep counterfeit parts out of the supply chain. Fakes have bedeviled manufacturers and distributors for many years. At one time the problem centered on phony fasteners marked as high-strength and substandard copies of multi-pin, mil-spec connectors. In recent years counterfeiting has spread to integrated circuits. Counterfeit ICs might be blacktopped used parts or reverse-engineered copies. Such parts may function, but less reliably. Or they may be programmed with hidden spyware or backdoors for espionage.

So who is responsible? Cool heads prevailed in Congress. They made the counterfeit issue a shared responsibility across the entire supply chain. The government can’t simply wash its hands of the issue and force manufacturers to assume responsibility to control counterfeiters.  But manufacturers must secure their own supply chains. Nor can contractors assume all the risk, but they can agree to only buy from reputable sources.

Section 833 of the 2013 NDAA deals specifically with electronic parts. It says the cost of corrective measures when counterfeit components are found that are not a contractor’s responsibility if -- and this is a big if -- the contractor “has an operational system to detect and avoid counterfeit parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts that has been reviewed and approved by the Department of Defense.”

Also, if the government has supplied electronic components and they turn out to be fakes, the contractor is off the hook, provided it has given timely notice of bad or suspect parts.

But arguably the most important action a contractor must take is to source items directly from the original equipment manufacturer or an OEM authorized channel partner.

If these conditions are not present -- OEM authorization, an approved system to detect and avoid counterfeits, the parts are government-supplied and timely notice of suspects are reported -- then the rework or replacement cost burden falls on the contractor. The enacted version, by the way, is a significant improvement over the 2012 bill and the Senate version of the 2013 one, both of which placed all the burden on contractors with no safe harbor for earnest use of industry best practices such as only purchasing through OEM-authorized channels.

Sales and marketing operations don’t dictate a manufacturer’s purchasing and supply chain management practices. So it’s a good time to make the internal rounds and impress on the procurement and manufacturing side of how important both good practices and visibility into them will be to federal sales.

Keep in mind, final rules on implementing Section 833 are months off, probably not years off as is the case with some rules since DOD has been working on this issue already for a few years. So it’s by no means too soon to get your ducks in line.

While you are at it, also get familiar with a new acronym which I am now coining -- BSAP, pronounced Bee-Sap. This honey comes with stingers. It stands for Baseline Software Assurance Policy. It is detailed in Section 933 of the 2013 NDAA. Congress has aimed this policy at making sure software developed for or sold into trusted DOD systems is free of cybersecurity weaknesses.

It requires use of automated analysis tools to test for vulnerabilities throughout the software lifecycle. And it calls for detailed risk identification and prioritizing strategies. All of this is to be baked into contract requirements and used in source selection. DOD officials have a year to figure out the testing methodologies and standards, including “how the Department might hold contractors liable for software defects or vulnerabilities.”

Again, there’s time before DOD translates the legislation into rules. But in both cases the sense of Congress, and therefore of DOD, is clear. Pentagon buyers will be paying a lot more attention to the component parts of the systems they acquire.


About the Author

Steve Charles is a co-founder of immixGroup, which helps technology companies do business with government. He is a frequent speaker and lecturer on technology and the federal procurement process. He can be reached at or connect with him on LinkedIn at

Reader Comments

Thu, Mar 20, 2014 E Kronthal

Another issue that complicates supply chain security is that in our global economy the definition of a foreign product can be less clear. Products manufactured in the US may have components manufactured abroad under different oversight. Here is an interesting article about this very issue from Dark Reading

Mon, Mar 4, 2013 Mark Goode Alexandria, VA

Addressing the counterfeit supply chain problem is a start, but a very small step in solving a huge problem. Counterfeit parts find their way into DoD systems because of the difference in innovation cycle times in the semiconductor industry and the penchant for DoD to keep in active use systems that employ now obsolete semiconductors that have long since ceased being produced by any vendor. That sets up the business opportunity for a vendor to sell "new old stock" and THAT creates traction for recycled semiconductor parts, also known as counterfeits. The much bigger problem is that semiconductor manufacturing has moved East . . . China's state capitalism combined with its willingness to fund semiconductor fabs that now cost $5-7 billion each, the far larger risk is the lack of a TRUSTED semiconductor supply chain for DoD. NSA has been cataloging a growing number of semiconductor devices that are fully legitimate commercial devices (NOT counterfeit) that contain hardwired malware, which is extremely difficult to discover. These devices support capabilities such as beaconing (rogue backchannel communications to unapproved IP addresses) as well as remotely activated kill switches that can disable a defense system. But DoD's Trusted Foundry program, which supports only one fab - IBM - is NOT a mandated supplier for DoD systems. So, the organic defense supply chain procures on the open commercial market, one that is increasingly dominated by suppliers in the East. Filtering out counterfeit parts is one aspect of the solution but it doesn't begin to touch the far more fundamental and threatening problem of an untrustworthy semiconductor supply chain which is now the BACKBONE of DoD's network-centric warfighting systems.

Sun, Mar 3, 2013

Robert, I agree with you about the lacking "system" and the "process", however, I believe the intent to be as reported in the article (not as written in 2012/2013NDAA). Specifically, there needs the insertion of the word "or" at the beginning of sub paragraph (ii). It's hard for me to believe that the only intended "safe harbor" incorporates all three sub paragraphs. Perhaps it will be clarified upon publication of 2012-D055?

Fri, Mar 1, 2013 Robert Metzger Washington, D.C.

I understand Section 833 differently. It offers a "safe harbor" only if a contractor encounters a counterfeit electronic part that was furnished to it by the Government. That is very limited comfort as the greatest challenge to contractors is satisfying continuing demand for parts that no longer are in production or available from OCMs or authorized distributors. These contractors typically must acquire themselves. Moreover, until new regs and practices are in place - and they are overdue - there is no way for contractors to know what system will qualify for Government approval; nor is there any process to secure or document that approval.

Thu, Feb 28, 2013 Girish Seshagiri United States

Thanks for the reference to Section 933 and the mandate to Dr. Carter to report back to Congress within one year "how the Department might hold contractors liable for software defects or vulnerabilities." This is a bold step from the world's largest buyer and has the potential to positively impact one of software engineering's persistent problems - the exponential rise in cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The ability to deliver software virtually free of cybersecurity vulnerabilities on predictable cost and schedule will emerge as a disrupting innovation in software applications development. It will make for a level playing field where smaller firms can compete on quality.

Show All Comments

Please post your comments here. Comments are moderated, so they may not appear immediately after submitting. We will not post comments that we consider abusive or off-topic.

Please type the letters/numbers you see above.

What is your e-mail address?

My e-mail address is:

Do you have a password?

Forgot your password? Click here

Washington Technology Daily

Sign up for our newsletter.

Terms and Privacy Policy consent

I agree to this site's Privacy Policy.


contracts DB