Pulling no punches on Army acquisition

The October report from the Special Commission on Army Acquisition andProgram Management in ExpeditionaryOperations, led by former Defense undersecretaryJacques Gansler, contains someimportant findings and a set of recommendations thatwill require collaborative leadership from the Army,Defense Department and Congress.In unusually blunt language,the commission concluded thatthe Army has not structured itsacquisition capabilities to meetits contemporary mission norhas it provided neededresources. The report identifiesshortfalls in the acquisitionworkforce, a decline in seniormilitary leadership with acquisitionexpertise and weaknesses incivilian personnel policy.According to the report, thosefactors have combined to inhibitthe Army's support of its contingencyand expeditionary operations.Accordingly, the commission recommendsfour major areas for action: None of those issues is new. Manyhave been cited in GovernmentAccountability Office reports, by theSpecial Inspector General for IraqReconstruction (SIGIR), and in theProfessional Services Council's jointwork with the Army on Iraq contractinglessons learned. Some or all havealso been prominent in other assessmentsof government acquisition. Butthis report is among the most focusedand actionable of its kind. Moreover, itsrelevance goes well beyond the Army.A broad consensus exists that thegovernment's acquisition infrastructure,while far from the dysfunctional,abuse-prone mess that some allege, isnonetheless in dire need of new energy,commitment and resources. Thereis also a broad consensus that theacquisition leadership across theagencies and on Capitol Hill has notbeen what it needs to be. Indeed, asthe Gansler Commission report says,acquisition must be, but most often isnot, seen and treated as a critical,core, management and strategic competencyof the government.It's not that Congress or the agencieshave ignored acquisition workforceissues. The Senate-passedCollins-Lieberman contracting billhas important provisions designed tobolster the acquisition workforce, andthe fiscal 2008 Defense appropriationslaw funds additional contracting,program management and auditingpositions. Other legislation containsadditional acquisition workforceprovisions. And the federal agencieshave been conducting competencysurveys to identify their skills gapsand needs in the contracting arena.But all of those initiatives representjust a start and are generally limitedin scope. The Gansler Commissionconcluded that the Army's acquisitionsystem is in need of a comprehensiveretooling of its organizational structures,personnel policies and priorities.The commission also recommendedthat the emphasis be on thefront and middle of the process ?particularly requirements definitionand contract administration ? ratherthan overreliance on after-the-factauditing and second-guessing. Again,the same can be said of acquisitionacross the federal government.Many special government commissionreports drop quickly from viewfollowing their initial release and oncethe true complexity of the issuesinvolved becomes clear. How manyremember the recommendations ofthe Volcker Commission, which concludedthat the government is tryingto meet 21st-century needs with a20th-century structure? What aboutthe SIGIR's series of reports on contracting,program management andpersonnel? Anyone who rememberswill see familiar themes in the GanslerCommission report.The odds are against it, but weshould hope that this report will havea more lasting effect than many thathave preceded it and that the governmentwill promptly and fully implementits common-sense and targetedrecommendations. We know the lessons.The question is whether we'vereally learned them.